|
Immediately after the fall of Singapore in 1942 certain Army circles argued that Japan should exploit her advantage and seek peace with Great Britain. The heart of this reasoning was the fact that Japan could not knock out both the United States and England, judging from such factors as national strength and geographical location. The Soviet Army had recovered from its initial setbacks in the war with Japan's ally Germany, and had regained its feet. Under the circumstances, Japan should plan to conclude a so-called compromise peace, seizing the opportunity after attainment of her war objectives. This sentiment was held by very few people, however, and most of the military paid scant attention to it. Planning for and prosecution of war then followed. ==Expected counterattacks== Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first-phase operations. In planning second-phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter-offensives could be expected starting in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter-assault began in the latter half of 1942. |-valign="top" |width="20%"|Hawaiian area |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|Midway |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|West Samoa |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|Fiji |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|New Caledonia & Loyalty |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|Australia |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|New Zealand |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|British India |width="80%"| |-valign="top" |width="20%"|Ceylon |width="80%"| |} This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well-which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large-scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re-activated until February 6, 1944. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Japanese military strategies in 1942」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|